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Abstract
Sociotechnical systems are complex, layered and rich with relationships and interactions. It can be
challenging to frame such systems in ways that allow both practical insights and access to deeper
contexts and underlying beliefs. This paper proposes a simple and progressive sensemaking model for
understanding these layered narratives, and uses it as a prism through which to explore the controversial
Australian social welfare benefits repayment initiative known as Robodebt.
Keywords Sociotechnical systems, sensemaking, framing, complex, Robodebt
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1 Introduction and Context
Digital technologies are portrayed positively as enablers of business, agents of personal connection, and
tools of change. They are also portrayed as dehumanising, arbitrary, exclusionary and alienating.
However, these technologies are created by humans and have no agency of their own: which is not to say
that they are neutral. How such technologies are conceived and understood will in part depend on the
broader sociotechnical system(s) of which they form part.
The study of these sociotechnical systems is not straightforward. Open and boundaryless, they are
difficult to frame and invite a multitude of narratives. As emergent forms, only the study of the system
itself will inform enquirers about its nature. Yet, these systems need to be understood, either to learn
from their failure, or to support their continued smooth operation. In the words of Emery, one of
sociotechnology’s original researchers, “The more we know about these systems, the more we can
identify what is relevant to a particular problem and detect problems missed by the conventional
framework of problem analysis” (Emery 1993, p. 157).
Guided by the question: “How might we better understand the nature of complex sociotechnical
systems?”, this paper proposes a simple sensemaking (Weick 1995) model and uses it to explore a
contemporary example of sociotechnical failure.

2 Literature: Understanding Complex Sociotechnical Systems
Sociotechnical systems were first described in the years after World War II by Tavistock Institute
researchers seeking to understand how the interactions between mine workers and the technologies at
their disposal shaped human work relationships, practices and structures (Trist 1981). Initially studied
in team-based industrial settings, sociotechnical systems were soon taken to encompass the
organisation as a whole, and then its “macrosocial” network of external relationships (Trist 1981, p. 50).
Technologies in general were seen as key contributors to the ability of sociotechnical systems to selfregulate and to maintain their ability to function under a variety of conditions (homeostasis). This
importance stems from their role in managing the porous boundary conditions that exist at the edge of
the enterprise and its external environment (Emery 1993). Digital technologies, predicted by the early
researchers, would pervade and then profoundly reshape sociotechnical relationships (Trist 1981).
These digital technologies were – and often still are – characterised as complicated rather than complex
systems. Complicated systems, unlike complex ones, are said to be fully describable (Cilliers 2002, p.
14). However, it does not follow that a technology that can be enumerated through its features, functions
is merely complicated. Technologies are conceived in environments that shape their design, purpose and
subsequent operation, and they in turn influence their environments. This interdependence is the very
essence of sociotechnology, and is also a feature of complex systems (Cilliers 2002). Technology
artefacts, and therefore the sociotechnical systems of which they form part, are neither value free (Pacey
2014) nor neutral (Kranzberg 1986).
Causal reasoning and techniques like root cause analysis are of limited assistance in understanding how
these complex sociotechnical systems fail (Dekker 2011) or, conversely, how they continue to function.
Multiple narratives are possible, shaped by the perspectives of participants and researchers. These
narratives are necessarily partial, often arising from our imperfect knowledge of the frame (our bounded
rationality) that restricts our attempts at sensemaking.

3 Framing Sociotechnical Systems
Sociotechnical systems are complex, layered and rich with relationships and interactions. It can be
challenging to frame these systems in ways that allow both practical insights and access to deeper
contexts and underlying beliefs.
The researchers who first described sociotechnical systems explicitly understood them to be a way of
seeing and a sensemaking tool: “The first function of a socio-technical systems concept is as a frame of
reference—a general way of ordering the facts” (Emery 1993, p. 159). In the spirit of Emery’s work, this
research aims to create a simple framing through which disparate perspectives can cohere into a
continuous narrative that incorporates them all. Our approach is informed by the work of complexity
theorist Paul Cilliers, who observed that: “The distinction between complex and simple often becomes a
function of our ‘distance’ from the system (Serra and Zanarini 1990: 4, 5), i.e. of the kind of description
of the system we are using” (Cilliers 2002, p. 3).
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We propose a simple three-part model (Figure 1) that progressively widens the framing of the system
both outwards and through time, so that practical, operational deficiencies can be addressed while also
holding more complex sociotechnical challenges in mind. The model establishes an anchoring narrative
whose purpose is to create a structure from which to explore the full richness of a complex,
sociotechnical, digital ecosystem.

Figure 1: A Sensemaking Model for Sociotechnical Systems
The initial frame calls for understanding a digital sociotechnical system as a technology artefact or
product. A broader second frame considers the context and environment in which the product comes
into being, or the purpose behind its design. The third and broadest frame considers the philosophy
of the system, being the beliefs or doctrinal underpinnings that have contributed to shaping the purpose.

4 The Online Compliance Intervention (“Robodebt”)
The Online Compliance Intervention (OCI) initiative, widely known as Robodebt, was an Australian
federal government benefits overpayment recovery programme that operated between 2016 and 2019.
Condemned as an illustration of creeping “digital welfare dystopia” by the United Nations (UN Secretary
General 2019, pp. 9, 21), the scheme sought to identify current and former welfare recipients who might
have received benefits in excess of their entitlements, and to extract repayment from them.
Initially, the OCI relied on human operatives to calculate and evaluate potential overpayments and to
decide on the appropriate action. However, from mid-2016, algorithms were developed to perform the
assessments, and repayment demand notice production was fully automated. This automation increased
the volume of assessments from some 20,000 per year to 20,000 per week.
The burden of disproving the validity of a demand notice fell to the benefit recipients, many of whom
were unable to produce the records required to substantiate their defence. There was no obvious means
of appealing the assessment in the absence of these records. Repayment demands were recharacterised
as real “debts” owed to the state. A variety of methods were used to recover these debts, including
garnishing benefits and tax refunds, and employing the services of debt collection agencies.
At the heart of the Robodebt initiative was the “income averaging” calculation used to identify
overpayments. This calculation smoothed the incomes of benefit claimants who were in irregular or
cyclical employment, and used the overstated income figures in the calculation of overpayments. This
methodology was deemed unlawful by the Australian Federal Court in November 2019, a judgement
that signalled Robodebt’s death knell (Karp 2019). A class action swiftly followed and in June 2021 this
too was settled in favour of the plaintiffs. In total, some AUD $1.7B has been earmarked to flow back to
Robodebt’s victims through a combination of refunds, debt waivers and compensation. In the 3.5 years
of its operation, the programme affected ~470,000 individuals and caused innumerable hardships,
reportedly including suicides (Whiteford 2021).

5 Framing Robodebt
Researchers have contributed thoughtful Robodebt analysis and commentary from the domains of
policy, technology, and the law. Whatever their specialisation, these accounts identify some common
failings including algorithmic bias (Akter et al. 2021; Carney 2018); lack of regulatory oversight (Carney
2018; Whiteford 2021); and indifference to the plight of disadvantaged populations (Akter et al. 2021;
Carney 2018).
The interwoven perspectives of these and other researchers provide a sense of the rich
interdependencies and sprawling span of this sociotechnical system – a span which is largely defined by
the gaze of the individual researcher. How then might we engage with such a system to study it? And if
narratives are, as Weick (1995) maintains, “a plausible frame for sensemaking” (p. 128), how might we
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understand the overlapping narratives around Robodebt? Our sensemaking model was used to create a
structured narrative account in which multiple perspectives can be represented and questioned.

5.1 Frame 1: Product
The initial frame concerns the design and operation of the technology artefact, and is the easiest to
construct. The technology is straightforward to describe and its flaws are evident. Official government
documentation, from two senate enquiries and a Commonwealth Ombudsman investigation, provides a
quantitative factbase of harms, illustrated with the personal stories of victims. In this narrow framing,
Robodebt presents as bad technology. It reads as a poorly thought-out and executed business process
automation (BPA) initiative that optimised for operational scale and efficiency (i.e. the vastly accelerated
volume of assessments) at the expense of quality and accuracy (i.e. the income averaging calculation).
In this frame, the failure of the OCI can be explained as a series of transgressions against ethics and good
technology practices. Witness the BPA implementation that entirely removed the human from the loop;
and the poor data governance that resulted in incorrectly addressed demand notices that never reached
their recipients. The four principles of the European Union’s Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI
(2019) are representative of the contents of a typical AI framework. The first principle emphasises
respect for human autonomy, including the human oversight of AI systems, and asks that these systems
“not unjustifiably subordinate, coerce, deceive, manipulate, condition or herd humans” (p. 12). The three
remaining principles address the prevention of harms and the requirement for both fairness and
explicability. It can be strongly argued that adherence to guidelines such as these would have prevented
Robodebt.
The judicial process pointed to the flawed income averaging calculation as the proximal cause of the
Robodebt failure, because the “debts” that it created were illusory and illegitimate. This process also
ruled that the design of the system contravened administrative law by requiring recipients of demand
notices to prove that their debt was invalid. Stop at this point, and middle management is to blame for
failures of professional ethics and practice. This perspective underlines that “no one in government was
fired for designing and operating an unlawful system for years on end” (Warren 2022, p. 34).
This first framing leads us to a causally satisfying narrative of management incompetence. It highlights
opportunities for better practices informed and constrained by AI and data ethics guidance, as well as
compliant to the rule of law. This is not to say that the practical turn of Frame 1 encourages a superficial
approach. On the contrary, central to Frame 1 thinking are questions of whether there is good technology
and bad technology, the preventability of harms, the special circumstances of no-optionality
government services, and what our digital governance and regulatory choices should look like.

5.2 Frame 2: Purpose
But what of the environment in which Robodebt was proposed, tested, piloted, implemented and
heralded as a success? The certainty of an identified root cause failure in ethics falls away when the
frame is widened to include the context in which relevant decisions were made.
Sometimes this context includes a declarative mission statement, such as John F Kennedy’s affirmation
that “we choose to go to the Moon in this decade” (Kennedy 1962). Robodebt was founded on such a
statement. The FY15/16 federal budget included a provision to recover $1.7B in benefits overpayments
over a period of 4 years. In the context of Frame 2, the ethical failures appear not as causal, but as trace
indicators of another narrative. Robodebt is no longer what happened: it becomes how it happened.
In this light, Robodebt, with all its flaws, appears purposeful. The public servants accountable for the
target mustered the tools at their disposal to deliver the outcomes desired by the government of the day.
Their behaviours were goal-directed or “characterized by choosing actions according to the outcomes
they produce in a certain situation” (Zwosta 2015, p. 1). Their scope for action was significantly
constrained by the limited target population and the large quantum of funds to be delivered. In this
broader framing, the imposition of a 10% debt recovery fee, the intimidating wording of the demand
letters and the difficulty in contesting an alleged debt can all be construed not as bugs (i.e. the
professional and ethics failures of the “bad technology” framing) but deliberatively, as features.
This framing entertains the possibility that, even if Frame 1 practices had been better and had avoided
Robodebt, any sociotechnical system constructed around the same declarative mission could foreseeably
have produced an equivalent outcome.
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5.3 Frame 3: Philosophy
The third frame deepens and widens to consider the underpinning, perhaps unspoken, belief structures
shaping the system. Using retroduction (Jagosh 2021), we can ask: “What would have to be the case in
order to believe that AUD$1.7B could be unlocked from welfare overpayments?”. Robodebt researchers
have pointed to a doctrinal component in the establishment of the FY15/16 budget measure. They
reference an underlying sentiment that welfare recipients incur “debts” to society and are also inclined
to claim benefits to which they are not entitled (Akter et al. 2021; Carney 2018; Whiteford 2021).
Counterfactual thinking (Byrne 2017) may be helpful in appraising the level of doctrinal influence in a
sociotechnical system. In this case, if overpayments had been made, it follows logically that
underpayments likely also occurred. The budget measure would therefore have been ethically balanced
if, and only if, underpayments had been factored into any calculations and symmetrical efforts were
made to detect and rectify both. This broadest framing speaks to the exercise of power and to its
legitimacy.
Each of the sensemaking model’s three frames has a narrative that is satisfying and complete within its
own boundaries. All three frames – and perhaps others – validly coexist. Figure 2 summarises how the
model can develop simple yet generative narratives that encourage future enquiry.

Figure 2: Framing Robodebt: Worked Example of a Sensemaking Model for Sociotechnical Systems

6 Conclusion and Future Research
One of the first challenges faced by a researcher seeking to study a complex sociotechnical system is that
these systems lack defined boundaries and can be understood in very different ways depending on the
frame of reference that is applied. Our suggested sensemaking model is a lightweight framework
intended to help researchers swiftly structure framing decisions. It is an attempt to allow the many
narratives that may surface in such a system to legitimately coexist, and thus to allow for work at
different levels, from practical technology improvements to the exploration of deep causal forces.
This sensemaking model forms part of a broader research agenda into trustworthiness in the digital
world and will be used in our continuing Robodebt case research and further planned case studies. These
case studies will enquire into the roles and interactions that may contribute to developing, sustaining,
and governing digital ecosystems that are safer for all to navigate.
We suggest that practitioners, especially those investigating systems failures in complex sociotechnical
settings, might use this model to structure the initial stages of their enquiry. We hope that the model
may also prove useful to researchers whose interests lie in the stratified narratives of sociotechnical
systems, or alternatively to those seeking the simplicity of a high-level framework.
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